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"Les a - coups d'acceleration de l 1histoire marquent la vie 
des peuplescomrne les sacrements celle du chr~tien. Ces periodes extra­
ordinaires soot aussi la biblioth~que ou, qui en a compris la grammaire, 
peut lire a livre ouvert les lois du changement social profond" Serge­
Christophe Kolm, La Transition Socialiste--La Politique Economique de Gauche, 
Paris: Les Edition du Cerf, 1977. 
"In the study of social phenomena, disorder is, it is true, the sole 
substitute for the controlled experiments of the natural sciences. But 
it sometimes happens that, in the midst of disorder, events move so 
rapidly that we are not able properly to observe them; disorder may be 
excessive even to the most detached of scientists." Frank D. Graham, 
Exchange, Prices. and Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany, 1920-23, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930. 
In the last few years, a unique combination of drastic internal and 
external shocks has turned Portugal into a testing ground for social and 
economic theories. But the ground is dangerous; nations are not laborator­
ies where the effects of different factors can be studied in isolation. If 
there are lessons to be learned from Portugal's experience, they must be 
based on a theoretical framework which enables one to disentangle events in 
which several forces operated simultaneously. 
In this paper we present an interpretationof the economic experience 
of Portugal since the revolution. We believe that the enduring consequence 
of April 25 has been the transformation of Portugal into what one might call 
a politicized market economy. In any market economy prices of goods and 
factors perform the dual role of allocating resources and determining the 
distribution of incomes. A politicized market economy is one in which tre 
distributional role of prices becomes a justification for their manipulation, 
but in which the allocative role of prices is not replaced by a centralized 
allocation of quantities. Examples of the resulting dilemma are present 
even in relatively non-interventionist countries: e.g. the problems of 
EEC agricultural prices or U.S. oil prices. But in Portugal the dilemma 
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has economy-wide consequence~ for the crucial politicized price is the price 
of labor. 
The real wage determines the distribution of income between capital 
and labor, yet it is also a price determining supply and demand. If the real 
wage is left to the market, it may not settle at a level which.is regarded 
as just; if it is set politically, it will not fulfill its allocative role. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives some background 
on Portuguese economic development before the revolution. Section 2 develops 
an analytical framework based on two "strategic variables"--output and the 
real wage--whose evolution is analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
Section 5 contains a brief conclusion. 
1. Background: Portugal before 1974 
In 1973 Portugal's economy was fairly typical of the group of middle 
income nations sometimes referred to as newly industrializing countries or 
"nics".1 These countries were able to achieve rapid economic growth during 
the 1960's and early 1970's via increased trade, exploiting their relatively 
abundant supplies of semiskilled industrial workers in textbook fashion: 
exporting labor-intensive manufactured goods, and also exporting labor 
directly in the form of emigrant workers. Portugal, with its 700,000 
emigrant workers, relied more than most nics on direct export of labor, 
but substantial exports of textiles, electronic components, and other labor 
intensive manufactures had also emerged by the early 70's. 
Table 1 presents some statistics on Portuguese economic growth 
before 1974, with comparable statistics of Spain and Greece for comparison. 
All three countries grew in somewhat similar fashion, so that these "soft 
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TABLE 1 
Growth in Southern Europe Before 1974 
Portugal Spain Greece 
Rate of Growth of GDP 
Per Capital, 1968-73 7.4 5.8 7.5 
Exports/GDP, 1968 24.2 13 .0 9.6 
Exports/GDP, 1973 25.8 14 .3 14.2 
Imports/GDP, 1968 29.2 15.6 18.2 
Imports/GDP, 1973 33.2 15.6 25.2 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
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underbelly" countries form a natural group. Several points stand out. 
First, growth was quite rapid, with real GDP per capita growing at rates 
which, if not up to South Korean or Taiwanese etandards, were still much 
higher than less developed countries in general have managed. Second, 
growth was pro-trade biased. In all of the countries exports and imports 
rose relatively to gross domestic product; i.e., the economies became more 
"open" as they grew. In 1974-77 Portugal diverged from the others; Spain 
and Greece continued to grow more open, while Portugal did not. 
In saying that Portugal achieved fairly rapid growth, we are not 
implying that all was for the best. One problem with the economic develop­
ment of Portugal is suggested if we notice that in qualitative terms 
Portugal was moving into an economic relationship with respect to industrial 
Europe similar to that of Puerto Rico with respect to the mainland of the 
United States. In other words, Portugal was becoming a dependent economy. 
One need not interpret "dependence" in a Marxist way, certainly not in a 
way that suggests that what was hap~~ning was economically bad for Portugal. 
The problem was (and is) simply the fact that Portugal's economy is 
strongly affected by economic policy decisions of the industrial countries, 
decisions in which it has no voice. 
The other problem with Portuguese growth was distributional. While 
it is probably true that nearly all Portuguese gained from growth, the 
gains were distributed unequally, both between city and countryside, and 
between the population at large and the elites which controlled economic and 
political life. There is little hard evidence on this, but Portugal by 
1973 appeared to be a "dualistic" economy whose traditional sector had not 
shared fully in growth. 
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Despite these problems, it is difficult to avoid regardin2 the 
Portuguese economy before 1974 as a successfu] one. Portugal was still, 
in 1973, a poor country;_but it was steadily catchinp un with the in­
dustrial west. 
This qualified success storv came to an abrunt eno in the fall 
of 1973. The oil embargo had a µarticularly strong effect on Portugal, 
despite her claim on the abundant oil of Angola. In February 1974 infla­
tion shot up to over 30 percent at an annual rate, suuplies of some food­
stuffs in Lisbon were disrupted, some white collar trade unions went on 
strike and it was in a political vacuum that an 'Armed Forces ~fovement'-­
of ambiguous economic ideolory--took power on April 25. 
Suddenly, then, the Portu?-uese econo~v was subiectec. to a unioue 
combination of shocks. Political and social revolution at home, in 
addition to its direct effects, triggered a massive return of settlers 
from Africa. At the same time the crisis in the world economy raised 
the prices of imports, depressed the demand for exports, and provoked a 
return of emigrant workers. 
We will, once again, attempt to isolate a few crucial aspects of 
these complex economic events. We now turn to an explicit discussion 
of the theoretical framework determining our choice of points to emphasize. 
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2. A Framework for Analysis 
Our method in this paper will be to concentrate on two "strategic" 
variables, the real wage rate and the level of output; or more precisely, 
on output relative to potential and the real wage relative to its "warranted" 
level, a concept which will be explained below, Other aspects of Portugal's 
economy will be considered either as affecting these strategic variables 
or as being affected by them. In other words, we will attempt to sort out 
the tangle of events by first tracing the path of the strategic variables; 
then working backward to the major causes of changes in these variables; and 
finally moving forward to the effects of the changes. 
The idea of concentrating on a few strategic variables is probably 
worth justifying, although this is not the place for an extended method­
ological discussion. Our basic suppositions are that, while the number 
of variables which have been subject to changes in recent years is large, 
the number of variables which are of crucial policy importance is fairly 
small. At the same time, we suppose that some of these crucial variables 
can be regarded as determined by the others, so that the structure of the 
economy looks something like this: 
Exogenous Strategic Other 
and Policy Variables Crucial>
Variables Variables 
where the strategic variables are thus both important in their own right 
and the intervening variables through which other important variables are 
determined. Among the exogenous and policy variables we would put oil 
prices, the exchange rate, government spending, and so on; the main crucial 
but not strategic variables are the balance of payments, unemployment, and 
the distribution of income, 
The virtue of this scheme is that it lets us focus on a relatively 
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limited number of channels of cause and effect. The defect is, of course, 
that it involves a simplification, and may give a somewhat misleading 
astransparency to events. However, when there are a few shocks drastic 
as those which Portugal has experienced, even very simple analysis can be 
enlightening. 
Let us begin, then, by discussing the crucial relationships which we 
believe obtain in the Portuguese economy. First, and most obvious, is the 
relationship between output and unemployment. Other things equal, higher 
output will mean higher employment, and there is some level of output which 
corresponds to "full employment" (which includes allowance for some normal 
level of unemployment). 
Less often emphasized but also crucial is the relationship between 
output and the real wage, on the one hand, and the current account of the 
balance of payments on the other. Clear!~ increasing output will swell the 
demand for imports and, other things equal, worsen the balance of payments. 
Holding output constant, an increase in the real wage will normally involve 
increasing the price of domestic relative to foreign goods, so that there 
will also be a negative effect of the real wage en the balance of payments. 
When,for simplicity, the level of output consistent with full employ­
ment is independent of the real wage, these relationships can be illustrated 
with a diagram like Figure 1.
2 
In the diagram, one axis measures X, the level 
of real output, while the other measures the real wage rate w. The vertical 
line IB indicates the level of output consistent with full employment, while 
the line XB indicates the combinations of real wage and real output consi~tent 
with current account balance. The diagram shows that, given full 
employment output Y*, there is a unique level of the real wage W*, which is 
as the "warranted"consistent with external balance. We will refer to W* and Y* 
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real wage and "potential" output.respectively. They are the only levels of 
Wand X which are consistent with equilibrium in both the labor and foreign 
exchange markets. Departures from these levels always involve a situation 
of disequilibrium--that is, a situation of economic or social stress. 
The possible kinds of disequilibrium are illustrated by the "zones 
of ~conomic unhappiness" surrounding the equilibrium point. For each zone 
the state of the labor market and of the balance of payments are indicated. 
On the eve of the revolution Portugal was in a situation of tight labor 
markets and payments surplus, i.e., it was in the southeastern zone of the 
diagram. Since late 1974 the characteristic state of the economy has been 
more like that in the northwest zone--persistent unemployment and current 
account deficits. 
While a diagram like Figure 1 is of considerable diagnostic use, it 
has some defects if one tries to use it to discuss events in Portugal. The 
problem is that the schedules have undoubtedly shifted drastically. For 
example, the arrival of the returnees must, by increasing the supply of labor, 
have increased potential output and reduced the warranted real wage. In 
LUorder to trace out the path of the economy one would not only have ·- keep 
track of W and X but of the shifting IB and XB schedules as well. This 
would destroy the simplicity of the scheme. 
What we will do to avoid this problem is replace W and X as our 
the actual values relativevariable by W/W* and X/X*: that is, by to 
their equilibrium values. To a first approximation, one would expect 
the XB and IB schedules to remain unchanged when drawn in this space. 
Thus the effect of, say, a rise in oil prices--reducing the warranted 
real wage-would be to raise W/W* for a given W, not to shift the XB 
curve. The variables W/W* and X/X* become our strategic variables, and the 
starting point of our analysis is a story about their path over time which 
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Figure 1 
The "Zones of EconotTlic Unhappines
s" 
IB 










makes sense of the observed economic developments. 
This may be an appropriate place to say something about the "structural" 
aspect of Portugal's economic difficulties. 3 It is often argued that con­
ventional macroeconomic analysis is not applicable to Portugal because the 
problems are not primarily due to increases in real wages or domestic de-
mand, but are rather the result of real shocks such as the rise in oil 
prices and the loss of the colonies. What this amounts to saying is that 
in our Figure 1 the schedules have shifted; or, equivalently, in Figure 2 
the movement of the economy has been due primarily to changes in W* and Y*. 
In fact, we would agree that such "structural" changes have been large and 
important. But the attempt to use the cause of disequilibrium to determine 
the remedy is a mistake. Suppose that external shocks--such as an oil price 
increase-were to lead to a combination of balance of payments deficit and 
unemployment, the real wage having remained unchanged. Even though real 
wage increases would not be the cause of disequilibrium, it would still be 
the case that the real wage would have to fall to achieve internal and 
external balance. Whatever the cause of disequilibrium, conventional 
macroeconomic analysis can still be used to determine the way back to 
equilibrium. 
Returning to the analytical framework, in Figure 2 we indicate 
schematically the course we believe Portugal has followed since 1973. In 
as1973 the Portuguese economy was in a situation of tight labor markets, 
shown by the low unemployment rate, and was running a current account 
surplus; thus our starting point, as shown in Figure 2, is one of dis­
equilibrium. There followed a series of events which we would divide into 
three phases, shown in our schematic as 1, 2, and 3. 
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Fiiwre 2 




(i) Phase 1 (1974-75): There was a rise in real wages and a slump 
in output (in 1975 only). Unemployment increased and the current account 
moved into deficit. Because of the oil price increase, the world recession, 
and the increase in Portugal's labor force, th.e warranted real wage dropped 
considerably. The last factor may also have increased potential output. 
Thus we suppose in Figure 2 that 1974-75 was marked by a sharp rise in W/W*, 
as the numerator rose and the denominator fell, and also by a decline in 
X/X*. 
(ii) Phase 2 (1976-77): Under pressure from wage controls, devalu­
ations, and the overhang of unemployed, real wages fell. But an explosion 
of credit produced rapid growth in output. The effect of output expans.ion 
was enough to worsen the external balance in spite of the decline in real 
wages. 
(iii) Phase 3 (1978- ): Real wages continued to decline; but 
this was now accompanied by tightened credit, producing slower output growth. 
As we show in Figure 2, the effect has been to move Portugal close 
to external balance. 
To explain why Portugal has followed this path requires a more de­
tailed examination of events. This is done in the next two sections: Section 
3 analyses the course of expenditure, output, and the capacity of the economy; 
Section 4 discusses movements in real wages and their relationship to changes 
in the equilibrium real wage rate. 
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3. Output · 
The evolution of output in Portugal since 1973 is summarized in 
Table 2. Until 1977 real gross domestic product in 1975 prices grew on an 
average at a rate of 2.4% p.a., much less than the growth rates of the late 
60's and early 70's but still above the comparable EEC figure of 1.8%. As 
is apparent from the table, however, the variability of Portuguese output 
was also higher. 
The figures for 1977 and 1978 are still first round official estimates 
and some .earlier figures are included to show the precarious nature of these 
estimates. Ftrst-round official estimates of 1973-75 output available in 
mid 1976 were substantially revised twice and led to underestimating the 
strength of the 1976-77 recovery. Forecasts have been even less reliable. 
The best 1976 forecast for 1977 was a supoosedly "optimistic'' one which as­
sumed a 10 percent increase in investment, regarded as extreme at the time. 
Yet output growth was less than forecast. 
The Plan forecast of growth for 1979 is 2.8 percent; given the 
rise in oil prices and the downward revisions in estimates of OECD growth, 
this is probably over-optimistic. 
Chart 1 shows that the decline in the growth rate in 1974 and 1975 
was also accompanied by a sharp fall in the share of output devoted to 
investment. This obviously tended to reduce the rate of growth of potential 
output. And the investment figure--which is in any case highly unreliable 
--understates the problem. A large part of capital formation in the post 
1973 period has gone to public sector projects of questionable productivity, 
particularly the immense Sines project. The decline in private investment 






1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1. Current prices GDP f.c. 















3. GDP m.p. 1975 prices 
Estimated in 
3.1 1979 388.8 393.2 376.2 402.0 423.4 437.1 
3.2 1978 389.3 393.7 376.7 406.7 426.6 
4. Forecast in 
4.1 1976 377.8 389.0 373.5 390.3 408.0A 
414.4B 
4.2 1977 
Growth rates% p.a. 
383.3 397.4A 
402.SB 
5. Portugal 11.9 1.1 -4.3 6.9 5.3 3.2 2.0 
6. EEC average 5.9 1.6 -1.5 5.0 2.3 2.8 3.2 
Sources: 1. a) 1973-76 Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (except for 
construction in 1976. source lb) 
b) 1977-78 Banco de Portugal and Departamento Central de 
Planeamento 
c) 1979 DCP forecast in Grandes Op5oes do Plano, 1979 
2. a) 1973-78 same as above 
b) Adjusted for 1978 collected indirect taxes and 1979 budget
with own estimate for subsidies based on same ratio to in­
direct taxes as 1977. 
3. IFS (line 99b.p) same as 2. with numbers from 1978 Banco 
de Portugal Report for the 1979 estimate (corrected in August 
1979 issue of IFS)and 1977 Report for the 1978 estim~te. 
4. Based on DCP numbers for 1973-75 and projection from model 
in Abel et al. (1977) for 1976 forecasts and Abel and 
Beleza (1978) for 1977 forecasts. Forecast A (pessimistic) 
assumes constant investment, B (optimistic) assumes 10% 
increase. 
5. From 3.1; 1979 OECD (1979c) forecast 
6. OECD (1979c) 
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16 
public (state) investment increased by 19 percent, whereas housing declined 
by 6 percent and "productive" investment (itself mainly in the nationalized 
firms) declined by 6.7%, giving rise to the total decline of 3.4%. In 1977 
the 12% increase was more evenly spread between "productive" (13.3%) anc 
public (14.6%) but housing continued to lag at 5.5%. Plan figures show very 
little growth in investment in 1978-79. 
The effect was, apparently, a sharp reduction in the productivity 
of investment. A crude but suggestive indicator of this decline is the 
gross incremental output-capital ratio, which was .41 in 1969-73 but only 
.13 in 1974-5. We should note, however, that this measure of the producti­
vity of investment has declined world-wide. For example, in Japan it de­
clined from .29 in the period 1967-73 to .12 in the post 73 period. In 
the U.K. the decline was from .17 to .05. 
The swings in output in Portugal were also reflected in the crucial 
balance of payments. Table 3 shows the changes in that balance since 1973. 
In 1973, as we have already mentioned, Portugal was in surplus. The deteri­
oration in the external environment produced an abrupt deterioration in the 
trade balance. Slump in 1975 temporarily reduced the demand for imports, 
but the boom of 1976-77 led Portugal into a severe deficit and forced the 
adoption of austerity measures. 
The dramatic reversal of the external deficit in 1Q7P was a definite 
surprise. A ma_;or part of the improvement was a sun1:e in er,ip-rants' remit­
tances, and it is possible that this was in part dishoardin? of accumulated 
savings held abroad as confidence in Portugal's political stabilitv returned 
and nominal interest rates on deposits were raised. If this is the case. 
remittances will fall again, so that part of the improvement will turn out 
to be only temporary. However, exports have also surred, indicatin~ that 
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Table 3 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(in millions of dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) 
TRADE CURRENT ACCOUNT NON MONETARY TRANSACTIONS 
1973 -914 351 345 
1974 -2002 -829 -638 
1975 -1674 -819 -1016 
1976 -2115 -1246 -1179 
1977 -2533 -1500 -1437 
1978 -2300 -775 157 
1979 -740* - 276~ 723** 
Notes: * Jan.-June 
** Jan.-August 
Sources: 1973-1977 OECD 
1978 Banco de Portugal 
1979 Banco de Portugal and Cardoso (1979) 
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thPrL has heen a fundamental improvement in competitiveness. 
The r.xternal current account is related to national saving by 
the identity saving~ investment+ current account. It is natural, then 
to consider along with the current account the public sector deficit, 
which is a major source of dissaving, as is evident from Tahle 4. In fact, 
since investment has been so predominantly undertaken by the public sector, 
the overall deficit of the public sector is the appropriate measure of the 
gap between private savings and private investment, where nationalized 
firms are included in the private sector. 
Chart 2 shows a remarkably close relationship between the external 
current account and the public sector borrowing requirement, measured in 
dollars. The surprising turn of the external account in 1978-9 is again 
evident there, since the available evidence suggests a substantial worsening 
of the puhlic sector deficit. 
In output and expenditure, then, Portugal experienced some sizeable 
fluctuations. These fluctuations were somewhat larger than those of other 
European countries, and the balance of payments problem has been severe. 
~onetheless, Portugal has not been too far out of line with the experience 
of other semi-industrialized countries. What makes the Portuguese experience 
unique is the developments in the labor market, 
Portugal in 1973 was a country with an unusually high proportion of 
its population working outside the country. Emigrant workers were 17.57, 
of employed Portuguese in 1975. When recession came to Europe, emigration 
halted and partially reversed. At the same time, the returnees began 
19 
Table 4 
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTS 
(in million contos) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Current Overall Central Administration 
Balance Balance Budget (OGE) Balance (CGE) 
1973 9.0 2.6 5.2 -2.4 
1974 1.2 -7.0 8.1 -9.7 
1975 -9.3 -18.5 -13.9 -25.4 
1976 -13.0 -32.9 -31.8 -38.7 
1977 -12.6* -45.5* -59.9 -49.0* 
1978 -28.5* -79.3* -60.5 -76.6* 
1979**A-12 -6~ -66.0 n.a. 
B n.a. -113.0 -120.0 n.a. 
* Estimates 
** Forecasts 
Sources: 1973-76 Estatisticas das Financas Publicas 
1977-78 Banco de Portugal using data from Ministerio cias Financas 
1979: A OECD (1979b,p • .>4). 
B Revised official forecast for (3) Expresso, 10/13i79 and 
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21 
arriving from Africa. The result is shown in Table 5: there was a huge 
growth in the labor force, some 13 percent from 1973 to 1977, according 
to the only available estimate (source A). 
Because of the growing labor force, and because employment grew only 
slightly, unemployment rose to very high levels. (We are not confident in 
these figures, for reasons discussed in Section 4). A gap thus emerged 
between actual and potential output. We make an effort to measure potent~al 
output and the output gap in Table 6. Several assumptions are made. First, 
we assume that potential employment is 97 percent of the labor force: i.e., 
that the 3 percent unemployment of 1973 represents "full employment". 
Second, we assume that the ratio of the marginal productivity of labor to 
average productivity is one-half, based on the 1973 labor share. Thus we 
compute "full-employment" employment as 97 percent of total labor force, and 
assume that the additional workers would have one-half of the average product 
of those already employed. 
The numbers produced by this rough calculation show a large output 
gap, only slightly narrowed by the 1977 boom. While the output gap is 
large, however, even closing it completely would still leave the growth 
rate of per capita GDP since 1973 quite low. In other words, potential 
output has grown slowly given the rise in the population. The chief reason 
for this is the slow growth in productivity. From 1973 to 1978 GDP per 
rate of only 1.9%. This is, of course,employee rose 10%, an annual growth 
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the counterpart of the low output-capital ratio already mentioned. 
On balance, then, averaging over the fluctuations, output has £siled 




EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Thousands) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Employment Unemployment Civilian Labour Force 
A B C A B C A B C 
1973 3046 n.a. n.a. 99 n.a. n .a. 3145 n.a. n.a. 
1974 3061 3767 3621 180 86 47 3241 3853 3668 
1975 2980 3735 3714 396 222 133 3376 3957 3847 
1976 3005 3820 3759 504 276 244' 3509 4096 4003 
1977 3097 3781 3787 455 326 291 3552 4107 4078 
1978 n.a. 3809 3736 450* 348 319 n.a. 4157 4055 
Note: (1) • (3) - (2) 
Sources: A - Gabinete de Escudos, Planeamento e Organiza~ao, Ministry of 
Labour as reported by Banco de Portugal • 
B - INE, 1st. semester survey as reported in Banco de Portugal 
C - INE, 2nd. semester survey as reported by Banco de Portugal 
*as reported in BPA, Conjuntura, n°12. 
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Table 6 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND THE O[TPLTT rAP 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1. Unemployment(%) 3.1 5.6 11. 7 14.4 12.8 13.0* 
2. Output Gap(%) .05 1.88 4.93 6.66 5.62 5.75 
3. Potential Output 389.0 400.6 394. 7 428.8 44 7 .2 462.2 
(million contos) 
Sources: (1) - 1973-77: Table 5, Source A (1- (2)/(3) x 100. 
197~: reported in OECD (1979b) fro~ Source A. 
(2) (((1) - 3.0)/(100-(1))) X .5 
(3) ((3) from Table 2, lin~ 3.1.) x (1 + (2)/100) 
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3. Real Wages 
The movements in the real wage rate in Portugal, and the changes in 
the distribution of income which accompanied these movements, perhapsare 
the most striking feature of economic developments since. 1973. As is shown 
in Table 7, Portuguese real wages rose sharply in the first eighteen months 
following the revolution, then began an extraordinary decline which left 
them, by 1978, well below their pre-revolution level. (There are-once again-
problems with the figures, as discussed below). The labor share in 
national income paralleled this movement, although the rise in the labor 
share from 1973 to 1975 was much larger in percentage terms than the rise 
in real wages, so that in 1977 the labor share was still substantially above 
its 1973 level. 
As we have already suggested, however, the crucial variable from the 
point of view of achieving internal and external balance is not the wage rate 
.£!!_~but the wage rate relative to its ''warranted" or equilibrium level. 
While the warranted real wage rate is not directly observable, there can 
be little question that it fell sharply in the first two years following the 
revolution, for reasons discussed below. Thus, the ratio of the actual to 
the warranted real wage must have risen more steeply than the real wage it­
self. Where that ratio now stands is a difficult question which we will 
postpone to the end of this section. 
Let us begin by discussing the factors affecting the movement of 
real wages since 1973. We will then turn to a consideration of the factors 
which must have affected the warranted real wage, making an effort to put 
at least an order of magnitude on the movements in this variable. Finally 
we will discuss the implication of the movements in both variables. 
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Table 7 
REAL WAGES AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1. Real Wage 
(1973 = 100) 100 106 109 101 91 89 
2. Labor Share 
in Income (%) 51.6 57 .0 68.9 66.6 60.0 56.4 
3. Terms of Trade 
(1973 = 100) 100 89.9 76.8 73.2 74. 9 76 
S01.1rces: 1973-77: 1: IFS 
2,3: World Bank (1978). 
1978: 1: INE, Boletim Mensal 
2, 3: Banco de Portugal 
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Causes of Changes in Actual Real Wages 
Since 1973 wages in Portugal have been largely a political 
phenomenon. The political climate affects wage settlement directly through 
its impact on bargaining and on public sector wage decisions. At the same 
time, government policy plays an important role in determining real wages 
through wage and price controls, taxation, and exchange rate policy. Market 
forces do have some effect, especially in the small-business sector. But 
the principal way that economic pressures affect real wages is by inducing 
the government to take action to push real wages towards a level which it 
regards as appropriate. 
In 1974-75 the internal situation in Portugal naturally made for 
intense pressure for real wage increases, while the "war chest•; of foreign 
exchange and gold left by the old regime allowed the successive governments 
to ignore external constraints for the time being. One can easily draw up 
a sizable list of factors making for wage increases. First, there were 
large increases in the minimum wage. Second, wages paid by the government­
-both in the traditional public sector and in newly nationalized firms--were 
sharply increased. Third, legal restrictions which were placed on dismissals 
~ facto forced firms to continue paying the wages of striking workers, 
with obvious effects on the balance of power in wage bargaining. Even 
the threat of bankruptcy was not much of a limitation, since loss-making 
firms were often able to get low-interest loans--in effect subsidies--to 
cover their wage bills. Finally, the political climate itself made for worker 
militancy and employer timidity. 
We should note that in addition to a redistribution of income from 
capital to labor there was a redistribution within the labor force to 
the less well-paid. In particular, changes in the tax system would have 
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made it necessary for higher-paid workers to have received much larger 
percentage wage increases to· keep up with inflation than those with lower 
initial wages, as shown by the figures reproduced in Table 8. 
The fact that nominal wage increases were in part translated into 
real increases, instead of merely being dissipated in inflation, was also 
largely due to policy. For one thing, many prices were controlled under 
an elaborate system instituted in 1974. This system kept cost increases from 
being fully passed on in many areas, especially in rents. Price controls 
were supplemented by subsidies used to keep down the prices of some consump­
tion staples. And import prices were kept down by thP. Bank of Portugal's 
s~pport of the escudo, 
With all of these forces working to raise real wages, it, is some­
what surprising that the real wage index reported in Table 7 did not rise 
more. In part this may reflect the unreliability of the statistics,~ but) 
there were also some factors working to depress real wages, notably increases 
in taxation and the worsening of Portugal's terms of trade. These factors 
are considered in our discussion of movements in the warranted real wage, 
below. 
From 1976 on many of the policies which had fostered real wage in­
creases in 1974-75 were reversed. A catalogue of major actions would in­
clude the following: 
(i) Ceilings were placed on wage increases. 
(ii) Controlled prices were raised. 
(iii) The escudo was repeatedly devalued. 
(iv) Subsidies were reduced and taxes increased. 
(v) Labor laws were changed so as to allow dismissals. 
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Table 8 
CONSTANT REAL TAKE HOME· PAY 
Equivalent nominal gross wage 
(contos/month) % share in increase 
1974 1979 Inflation Tax 
4 12.2 86.5 13.5 
8 25.8 79.8 20.2 
15 55.7 65.3 34. 7 
30 267.7 22.3 77. 7 
" Source: Banco Portugues do Atlantico, Conjuntura, 12, 
July 1979 
Note: See also Cadilhe - Costa (1978) 
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(vi) The interest rates on loans to loss making firms were increased. 
In addition to these policy actions, there was pressure on the wage 
rate from the overhang of unemployed workers, swollen by returnees from 
Africa and the halting of emigration to Western Europe. 
The most obvious way in which policy affected the real wage rate is, 
of course, through devaluation. Devaluation--if it is effective--has the 
effect of lowering the wage rate in terms of external prices. This in 
turn implies a fall in the real wage in terms of imports and other tradable 
goods. Chart 3 shows the Portuguese real wage in terms of external prices, 
as measured by a weighted average of the four principal trading partners, 
and in terms of the domestic CPI. It is clear that the large decline in 
the "external" real wage must have playe~ an important role in the decline 
of real wage in terms .of consumption goods. 
What is surprising about the post-1976 period is how severe the de­
cline in real wages has been. 7 The greater part of this decline took place 
UTider a socialist government, in a country where trade unions remain powerful. 
To make sense of the remarkable decline, we must consider the factors affecting 
the warranted real wage. 
Causes .2.!_ Changes in the Warranted ~ Wage 
Since we cannot directly observe the warranted real wage, it is 
necessary to attempt to infer it from indirect evidence. This can be of 
two kinds. First, the nature of the disequilibrium a country finds itself 
in can be an indication of the position of the actual relative to the 
warranted real wage. If, for example, a country finds itself oscillating 
between unemployment and balance of payments deficits, this is an indication 
that the actual real wage exceeds the warranted. Second, one can attempt to 
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Chart 3 
Internal and External Real Wage 
11 Q. 4P. (1973=100) 
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take account of the main factors which are likely to have affected the. 
warranted wage. We will concentrate first on the second approach. 
The factors affecting the warranted real wage may he divided into 
two groups. The more important group is the set of "external" shocks in 
1973-75 which were not under the control of policy: the rise in oil prices, 
the onset of economic stagnation in industrial countries, anc-1 the growth in 
the lahor force. Probably less important but still significant were policy 
increases in indirect taxes and in Social Security contributions.actions: 
let us start with the external shocks. The worsening in the inter­
national environment had the effect of reducing the real income of the. 
Portuguese nation as a whole, and therefore presumably of reducing the 
The size of this effect was quite large: as shownwarranted real wage, 
in Ta~le 7, Portugal's terms of trade worsened by 24 percent from 1973 to 
107R, which given the 1973 import share in GDP of 33 percent implies a re­
duction in real national purchasing power of about 8 percent. 
At the same time, returnees and returning emigrant workers from Western 
Europe swelled the labor force by about 13 percent. Since the capital 
stock was not increased accordingly--indeed, the period since the revolution 
has been marked by low investment--the fall in the capital-labor ratio 
must also have acted to depress the equilibrium real wage. 
Along w1th these external shocks came certain government actions which 
acted to further lower the warranted real wage, The most easily measurable 
of these were the increases in indirect taxes, from 13 percent of expenditure
 
in 1973 to 15 percent in 1978, and the increase in Social Security payments 
from 11 to 15 percent of labour income. Both of these widened the "wed~e" 
between the price of output and the remuneration received by factors of 
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Can we estimate the impact of these factors on the warranted real 
wag.e? There are a number of obstacles to any such calculation. First, 
there are the measurement difficulties: not one of the crucial numbers 
can be considered reliable. Secon~ there are technical difficulties arising 
from possible changes in the equilibrium share of wages in factor payments. 
If imports are a better substitute for capital than labor, the worsening 
in the terms of trade would tend to raise the equilibrium labor share (and 
conversely); the extent to which an increasing labor force lowers the equili­
brium real wage depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor. 
The best we can do is to make a hypothetical calculation, which will 
give some indication of the order of magnitude of the effects. Such a calcu­
lation is presented in Table 9. We must emphasize that the assumptions on 
which the calculation is based are extremely shaky; the true number could 
easily be considerably more or less than our number. So as not to give 
a spurious impression of precision, we deal only in round numbers. 
The first entry is the effect of the decline in the terms of trade. 
Here we assume that the proportional reduction in the warranted real wage 
is the same as the proportional reduction in real national purchasing power 
as a whole. The entry which follows is the effect of the 13 percent increase 
in the labor force. Two assumptions are made here: (i) The elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor is taken to equal one, so that the 
equilibrium share of labor did not change; 
8(ii) We use the 1973 labor share 
of one-half as a measure of the elasticity of output with respect to labor 
input. The result,then, is an estimate of 6 percent for the effect on the 
warranted real wage. The effects of tax increases, shown by the remaining 




HYPOTHETICAL CALCULATION OF DECLINE IN WARRANTED REAL WAGE, 1973-78 
Decline in terms of trade 
Labor force growth 
Increase in indirect taxes 
Increase in Social Security payments 
Total 
Less: Productivity increase 
r.quals: Decline in warranted real wage 










What is itmnediately apparent is that, without any deliberate
 
inflat1on of the figures, we are able to come up with a quit
e large 
number for the decline in the warranted real wage. In fact,
 if we are 
concerned with the ratio of the actual to the warranted wage
, this 
calculation suggests that the decline in the denominator of 
W/W* was 
morP important in 1973-75 than the rise in the numerator. We 
must 
repeat, however, that what we have done here is purely a sug
gestive 
calculation, not something which can be treated as a reliabl
e estimate. 
The shocks we have considered must have led to a once-for-al
l decline 
One would expect this to be offset over timein the equilibrium real wage. 
by the normal, secular growth in the equilibrium real wage. 
There are some 
First,
reasons for being pessimistic about this in Portugal's case,
 however. 
the years since 1973 have been marked by low productivity grow
th worldwide. 
Second, Portugal has had lower growth in investment since 1973
 than before­
-and much of the investment has, as discussed in Section 3, 
been devoted 
to public sector projects of doubtful productivity. Finall
y, the insti­
tutional changesbroughtby the revolution have probably had 
at least the 
initial effect of hindering productivity growth. This is ce
rtainly true 
in agriculture, and may also be true for the nationalized fir
ms. 
We can get a rough estimate of the actual secular growth in 
the warranted real wage by looking at actual labor productiv
ity. Our 
preferred estimate in Section 3 was that GDP per employee in
creased 
10% from 1973 to 1978. But we suspect this may be too high. 
Official 
data on employment are "very heterogeneous and partially con
tradictory" 
Growing employment in family(as generously described by the OECD). 
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enterprises, self-employment, and public administration has surely been 
. 9
understated. Unless GDP is comparably understated (which is also possi-
ble) the productivity growth is exaggerated. In any case, even if \.:e 
use the 10% estimate, we find that secular growth is much less than the 
impact decline in the warranted real wage. 
The implication of this is that the warranted real wage is probably 
still, in 1979, below its 1973 level; 10 percent below, by our estimate. 
What this means for the appropriateness of the actual real wage is the 
next question. 
The Current Situation 
Data for 1978 shows a real wage in Portugal down about 20 percent 
from its 1975 peak. At the same time, the disequilibrium state of the 
economy seemed to suggest that the real wage was still above its warranted 
That is, there was still some balance of payments disequilibriumlevel. 
(perhaps more than the current account indicated, since as pointed out in 
Section 3 some of the surge in emigrants' remittances may be temporary), 
together with high unemployment. 
As we have seen, given the size of the shocks which have affected 
Portugal, it is possible that the real wage is still too high to allow 
It issimultaneous balance of payments equilibrium and full employment. 
too soon to judge, however; we may be witnessing delayed effects of the 
earlier period of high real wages. 
In any case, there is no reason to believe that the real wage is 
currently very far from its warranted level. Indeed, if one compares 
our estimate of the decline in the warranted real wage with the estimated 
actual decline one sees that the two are almost exactly equal. Given the 
roughness of our methods, however, t~i9 9ee1!1in~ exeeti t"u~ei 1 a 111. "'i1,n v 
embarassing coincidence. 
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5. Ar Ass~ssm0nt 
. In the years since April 25th, the realistic alternatives availa­
ble to successive Portuguese governments have all been unpleasant. For 
the short run, the choice has always been between cutting real wages, in­
creasing unemvloyment, and running a balance of payments deficit. As re­
serves have been drawn down and foreign indebtedness has grown, the last 
option has become increasingly difficult to manabe. So the last five years 
h;,ve l-ieen marh,J by a narrowing of already binding constraints. 
rhe eventual direction of Portuguese policy has thus been deter-
rninec by the logic of the situation. Recent improvements in the 
external balance notwithstanding, the balance of payments constraint 
still precludes any sustained increase in either real wages or employ­
ment. 
Given the constraints on policy, d.etails of demand management are 
not of central importance. The actual record on stabilization is mixed. 
Ir 1074-75, aJthough the slump in Portugal was deeper than in the rest of 
E·:rope, this is not surprising given the severity of the internal and exter­
nal shocks. Ir fact Portugal did remarkably well: the actions of the govern­
ment, even though not consciously planned, acted to support demand and limit 
the initial d~age. 
That in 1976--77, the demand expansion, and in particular consumption 
and public investment surge, were larger than in the industrial countries, 
despite the overhang of the 1Q74-75 disturbances, was also in part the result 
of lack of a consistent policy, but this time was clearly inappropriate. 
Indeed this expansion dissipated the remnants of the "war chest" and pushed 
Portugal dc>eper into debt. eliminating the country's remaining room for maneu­
ver. More seriously, the implementation of poorly conceived investment 
37 
projects in the public sector did not improve the country's-prospects for 
long term growth. 
The austerity program agreed upon with the IMF in :fay 1978 harl 
thus to be more stringent than would have been the case, had it been 
implemented by the first constitutional government in the summer of 
1Q76. Also, with rising private savings, the diversion of these 
savings to financing the risinr, deficits of the public sector and state 
the enterprises has probably become a major cause of continuing inadeqac· 
of private investment; an inadequacy which is an important hraJ.·c on 
the growth of potential output and of the warranted real :vase. · 
Real wages are at the heart of Portug~l's ~xperience in recent 
years. In 1974-75 a huge gap opened between the actual and the warranted 
real wage. Then an extraordinary decline in real wages set in. pro~ahly 
closing this gap. The downwarrl.flexibility of real wages in post-revolu­
tion Portugal is remarkable; the far smaller declines in the early 1970's 
may have been a cause of the revolution. However, the fall of the 4th 
constitutional government in June 1979 has been linked to the announcement 
of an extraordinary tax on labor income, which suggests that the downward 
flexibility may have a floor. 
What can be learned from Portugal's experience? Perhaps the main 
lesson is in the "narrow limits of the possible" when one tries to re­
distribute income in a market economy. The allocative effects of disequili­
brium real wages, manifesting themselves in a critical balance of payments 
problem, forced governments of pro-worker sympathies to engineer a steep 
decline in workers' standard of living. The dilemma of the politicized 
market economy could only have been eliminated by going over to a centrally 
planned economy. But this would have other and we believe far worse 
political and economic consequences. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1oECD (1979a) lists as members of the group of newly industrializing 
countries the following nations: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia 
in -southern Europe; Brazil and Mexico in Latin America; and Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korean and Taiwan, in Asia. Note that the grouping 
together of these countries is not meant to deny the significant dif­
ferences in the growth process between, say, the "Gang of Four" in Asia 
and the southern European nations. 
4
')
This diagram draws on the well-known analysis by Swan (1960), as well 
as the recent discussion by Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa (1977). 
Allowing for a positive effect of the real wage on output would not 
change the analysis. 
3stallings (1979) emphasizes this aspect. 
4Portuguese estimates of fixed investment are based on sales of construc-
tion materials. Since administrative backlogs led to lax enforcement 
of building codes in this early post-revolution period, the composition 
of these sales changed, making estimation a hit-or-miss affair. Changes 
in stocks are estimated by even less reliable guesswork. 
5Productivity calculated in this way diverges from the esti~ates 
reported by the Banco de Portugal. In the 1977 Report, the growth, 
productivity for 1976 and 1977 above was 11~. The 1976 figure, however, 
was 7.1? in the 1977 Report and 3.4~~ in the 1976 Report. See further 
estimates in Macedo (1979, p. 232, note 61). 
6Tous the official figures for 1978 wage and price inflation are based 
on average annual earnings in manufacturing including social security 
payments and the new price index on the Continent whereas the series 
used in Table 7 line 1 and Chart 3 are the old indices of hourly wages 
and the Lisbon CPI including rent reported in IFS. The 1978 increase 
in the latter wage and price indices is 11% and 13% respectively, whereas 
the increase in the former is 18% and 21% respectively. The use of 
the Lisbon industrial wage index underestimates return to labour be­
cause both the Oporto industrial wage index and the agricultural index 
are higher, on the other hand the use of the Lisbon CPI including rent 
underestimates inflation. A weighted average of real wages in agricul­
ture, men and women, Lisbon and Oporto using the respective CPI's 
(without rent) just about matches the one in Table 7, except in 1976 
and 1977 where the values are 4 and 3 percentage points higher respectively. 
7The levelling-off of growth in the internal real wage before 1974 
suggests a ''rising expectations" story of the Portuguese revolution, 
a hypothesis which has been advanced in the psychology and politics 
literature, namely by Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970). The inverted 
J shape of the real wage series after 1974 is used by Kolm (1977) 
Figure 1 p. 35 as a revelation of the effects of a political victory 
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of the right following a political victory of the left in the cases 
of Chile and Portugal. The effect of the external shocks is however 
Notice that the external real wage has a much more pronouncedcrucial.
J pattern. 
8Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
have been made for Portugal by Sousa (1977) and Barbosa (1977). Sousa's 
estimate was 0.6; Barbosa's 0.8. In assuming a value of 1, we are 
biasing our results toward an understatement of the decline in the 
warranted real wage. 
9 (1979b, p. 10). The three sources indicated in Table 5 are not 
comparable with each other. Sources Band C, which are now the only 
ones used by Banco de Portugal begin in 1974 (See I~{E, Boletin Mensal, 
1979 no4,supplement) and the values of source A for 1978 are not 
directly available. These values are close to the ones indicated 
by Moura (1979, Table 4) which include agriculture and public sector 
even though (OECD 1979b, p. 11 footnote 10) claims that the Ministry 
of Labour poll excluded these sectors. 
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